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Abstract 
 
 Bioterrorism has become a concern for Americans since the 2001 anthrax letters.  
Many studies have been done regarding the possibilities of biological attacks since, and 
most deal with possibilities of large scale attacks.  However, there is reason to believe 
that small scale attacks are more likely.  Even though studies have been done revolving 
around the postal system and the spread of bioagents through mail, few if any studies 
have looked at an attack on a single building. 
 One particular method of attacking a building would be simply releasing an 
aerosoled contaminant in the building.  This purpose of this project is to develop a 
method for studying the spread of an aerosoled contaminant through a building and to 
determine what factors most affect the time between contaminant release and lethal 
exposure for an occupant in various locations.  A multizone airflow model, CONTAM, 
was used to run several scenarios to compare the effects of the air handling system, 
opening or closing doors, and which floor an occupant is located. 
 It was discovered that the air handling system had the greatest effect on a 
contaminant’s spread through a building.  Which floor an occupant was on had some 
effect, although insignificant compared to the air handling system’s effect.  Opening or 
closing doors generally was found to be important, but had the least effect on lethal 
exposure for an occupant. For the scenarios investigated, lethal exposure times ranged 
from 5 seconds to nearly 15 minutes. 
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Introduction 
 
 Throughout history, biological weapons have been used to wage war.  One of the 
earliest and possibly deadliest examples occurred in the mid-1300s in Kaffa as bubonic 
plague victims of the Tartar army were catapulted over the city walls.  Some believe that 
this is what lead to the epidemic throughout medieval Europe killing 25 million. The 
twentieth century saw the rise of research into biowarfare among nations across the 
world.  This led to the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, which 
forbids research of offensive biological agents and stockpiling bioweapons for military 
purposes [5]. 
 Bioterrorism has become a concern for Americans since the September 11 attacks 
on the World Trade Center because of several incidents involving anthrax.  The first 
occurred on 9/25/2001 when an assistant to Tom Brokaw, an NBC anchorman, began to 
develop cutaneous anthrax after handling a letter containing a powder.  By November 2, 
2001 the CDC had reported 21 cases of anthrax (16 confirmed, 5 suspected) [4]. 
 Possible bioterrorist agents/diseases are categorized by the CDC into three 
categories.  Category A Diseases/Agents are the highest priority risks.  These agents can 
easily be transmitted, result in high mortality rates, have potential for major public health 
impacts, and require special action for public health preparedness.  Currently there are six 
disease listed by the CDC in this category.  They are Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, 
Smallpox, Tularemia, and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers.  Category B Diseases/Agents are 
moderately easy to disseminate, have low mortality rates, and require enhanced disease 
surveillance by the CDC.  Category C Diseases/Agents are those considered to be 
available for mass dissemination, easily produced, and have potential for high mortality 
rates [3]. 
 In the 2001 anthrax exposures, the terrorists used the postal service to deliver the 
anthrax.  Letters were laced with anthrax powder that postal workers or the letter 
recipients would be exposed to.  One of the most feared means of making a biological 
attack would be releasing a large amount of some agent into the atmosphere in or over a 
large city.  If someone were to release 100 kg of anthrax over a large city for instance, the 
disease could kill millions [1]. 
 Such a release is not likely based on historical attacks.  Large-scale attempts have 
been attempted by terrorists in the past, but have all failed.  It is likely that terrorist 
groups lack the funds or technology to succeed in a mass casualty attack.  For instance, 
Aum Shinrikyo failed on ten separate occasions at an open-air urban attack of anthrax or 
botulism, despite having considerable wealth and scientific capabilities.  It is more likely 
that terrorist attacks will be small scale attacks or merely hoaxes [7]. 
 
Problem Statement 
 
 One possible means of a small scale attack would use a building’s ventilation 
system to spread a contaminant throughout a building in a matter of minutes to infect 
everyone in the building.  All that a terrorist might need is an aerosol can with some 
contaminant inside.  If the aerosol were placed in a return or intake vent, it would seem 
that the entire building would be in danger with relatively little difficulty to the terrorist. 
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 The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of such an attack on a 
generalized building and to provide a method for modeling such an attack for future 
buildings.  The time between contaminant release and the time at which an occupant is 
exposed to a lethal dose will be compared for various scenarios in order to determine 
what factors contribute most to occupant exposure. 
 
Modeling Method 
 
In order to analyze this type of threat, airflow modeling software is required.  
CONTAM is an example of such software.  CONTAM is a multizone indoor air quality 
and ventilation analysis computer program capable of determining airflows contaminant 
concentrations and personal exposures.  Using CONTAM, the movement of a bioagent 
through a building can be predicted by knowing the building’s layout and ventilation 
system. 
 The first step in using CONTAM is to draw a sketch of the building to be 
analyzed including all walls, ducts, and airflow paths (windows, doors, wall leakages, 
cracks, etc.).  Next the elements of the sketch are defined in the program.  For example, 
the dimensions of vents, fan flow curves, and zone sizes are all inputted.  Next, 
information on any contaminants are inputted along with the location and method of 
entering the building.  Finally, the program is ready to analyze the airflow for the 
building using a number of available simulation methods. 
For this study, a simple building was sketched to model several different 
scenarios.  The building is two stories tall; both floors have a large open space meant to 
represent a cubicle area; along two opposite sides of the building on each floor are 
smaller rooms representing offices.  Below, the CONTAM sketches for each floor are 
shown in Figure 1.  A description of icons on the sketch is given in Appendix A, and 
details of the specifications used for this project are given in Appendix B. 
 
 
First Floor     Second Floor 
Figure 1.  CONTAM building sketch 
 
 For the scenarios, a burst contaminant source was placed in a first floor office 
(location A) and a first floor maintenance room (location B).  The source would burst 0.4 
kg of an aerosol contaminant into the model at 10:00 AM.  Simulations were run with all 
of the doors in the building open and closed and exposure results were calculated in an 
office (locations 1,2) and in the cubicle area (locations 3,4) on each floor, giving a total 
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of sixteen scenarios.  The burst source is representative of and aerosoled release of an 
agent.  The office was chosen to represent a release location with full ventilation whereas 
the maintenance room has no ventilation. 
 CONTAM exports results for contaminant concentrations for every zone for each 
time step set for the simulation.  Five second increments were used for these simulations, 
although it was discovered after running the scenarios and calculating all the data that 
smaller increments should have been used.  To determine exposure for a person in each 
room, Microsoft Excel was used to integrate the data numerically.  These calculations 
were based on an inhalation rate of 20 m3/day, and an LD50 of 0.01 micrograms. 
 The LD50 value chosen is calculated for Inhalation Anthrax from the low end of 
the University of Alabama, Birmingham’s LD50 estimate of a 10,000-20,000 spores [2] 
and Ed Lake’s concentration estimate of one trillion spores per gram [6].  For the 
calculations, a 1% solution was assumed for the aerosol device, so the times until lethal 
exposure were based on 1 microgram of aerosol exposure.  The value of 20 m3/day was 
averaged from values used in several sources ranging from 15 m3/day to 24 m3/day.  For 
future use of this type of simulation, more precise values for particular LD50’s and 
inhalation rates may be applied, but for the purpose of comparing exposure factors, these 
estimates will suffice. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 Below is a table of the resulting times until lethal exposure for each of the sixteen 
scenarios.  The table is organized based on where the contaminant was released (Office 
or Maintenance), where exposure was calculated for an occupant (1st Floor Office, etc) 
and whether the doors in the building were open or closed.  The data is listed in mm:ss 
format. 
 
Exposure Location  
1st Floor Office 1st Floor Cubicles 2nd Floor Office 2nd Floor Cubicles 
Doors Open/Closed: Open Closed Open Closed Open Closed Open Closed 
Office 00:40 00:35 00:05 00:10 00:55 00:40 1:25 01:05 Contaminant 
Origin Maintanence 04:40 06:10 00:45 00:55 08:35 08:05 12:35 14:45 
Table 1.  Time to Lethal Exposure (mm:ss) 
 
For each room, the contaminant level and exposure level had similarly shaped 
graphs as functions of time.  A sample set of graphs is given below for the scenario in 
which the contaminant originates in a first floor office, doors are open, and exposure is 
measured in the first floor cubicle area, and for the scenario in which the contaminant 
originates in the first floor maintenance room with same exposure location.  These graphs 
however are given over a much larger time range than the time to lethal exposure.  
Graphs for each scenario studied are listed in Appendix C.  The major differences in the 
contaminant level graphs for different scenarios are the steepness of the initial increase 
and where the peak is, both in time and magnitude.  The slope of the line for exposure 
level is proportional to the magnitude of the concentration level.   
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Figure 2a – 1F office to 1F Cubicles 
Contaminant concentration and exposure level vs. time 
 
Concentration Level
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00
Time
m
g/
m
^3
Exposure Level
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00
Time
m
g
 
Figure 2b – 1F Maintenance to 1F Cubicles 
Contaminant concentration and exposure level vs. time 
 
The three main factors that can be seen in this study are that of the Air Handling 
System (AHS), whether or not doors are open or closed, and which floor an occupant is 
on.  The largest effect was that of the AHS, followed by the occupant’s floor, and the 
state of the doors in the building had the least effect. 
The effect of the AHS is seen by comparing exposure time between scenarios 
with the contaminant originating in the maintenance room with no ventilation and the 
office.  For an exposure in the same room, it would take 5 to 14 times as long for a lethal 
dose to be reached when the contaminant originated in the maintenance room as 
compared to the office.  The worst case, when originating in the maintenance room, was 
just 45 seconds in the adjoining cubicle area with open doors.  Most cases in which the 
contaminant originated in the maintenance room, however, had several minutes of 
exposure time.  This is most likely because the contaminant would have to first exit the 
maintenance room through relatively stagnant airflows before it could be spread through 
the building in the AHS.  When the contaminant originated in the office, the best case for 
an occupant was 1:25 with exposure on the second floor. 
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The effect of the floor an occupant is located on relative to the contaminant is 
most noticeable in situations with the contaminant originating in the maintenance room.  
In the scenarios studied, it would only be beneficial to be on the second story if those 
situations.  If the contaminant originated in an office, a person would become lethally 
exposed by simply traveling through the first floor cubicle area.  When the contaminant 
originates in the maintenance room, however, the contaminant level in the cubicles is low 
enough that a person could breathe for a few seconds before becoming lethally exposed.  
The only data that seems to be out of place when comparing differences between floors is 
comparing the contaminant going from the maintenance room to each of the cubicle 
areas.  Seemingly there is too great of a difference between the sets of times, but this 
difference would have been largely due to the AHS, as discussed above. 
It would have be expected that with a contaminant originating on the first floor 
the exposure times on a separate floor would be nearly equal in each second floor room.  
In the scenarios run, however, the second floor cubicle area consistently had a longer 
exposure time than the second floor office room.  This is suspected to be caused by 
unequal air circulation between the rooms.  If one room has a higher air exchange rate, it 
would follow that the AHS would deliver a contaminant to that particular room at a 
higher rate as well.  This fluctuation between rooms on the same floor would be different 
for each building modeled since it is dependent on the particular ductwork of a building. 
Having open or closed doors affected the outcome the least through the sixteen 
scenarios.  Additionally, the effect was dependent on the specific scenario.  In cases 
where the exposure data was taken in an adjoining room to the contaminant release and in 
nearly every case where the contaminant originated in the maintenance room, it was 
better to have doors closed.  When the contaminant originated in the office room, having 
the doors open was better in every exposure room excluding the adjoining cubicle area.  
This reversal is most likely because more of the contaminant escapes through an open 
door leaving less to enter the AHS which supplies the rest of the building. 
In the cases in which having the doors closed caused a faster exposure time, the 
exposures were taken in rooms farther from the source than in the cases with the same 
origin yet having doors closed lengthened the time.  This is most likely because when the 
doors are closed, more of the contaminant is forced through the AHS and so it spreads 
through the building more evenly, whereas if the doors are open, some of the contaminant 
would travel through the doorway, leaving less to enter the AHS.  This would cause 
rooms close to the origin to get to a lethal exposure level sooner and rooms far from the 
origin to get to the same level slower if doors were open. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In the event of an attack on a building similar to the one sketched in this study, it 
is clear that any AHS should be shutoff as soon as a threat is discovered, although the 
threat would need to be detected virtually immediately.  With the AHS on occupants of a 
building would have only seconds before being lethally infected by an agent.  Occupants 
should evacuate the building immediately, and in this scenario, should attempt to breath 
as little as possible while evacuating.  Traveling through the room with the highest 
contamination (barring the contaminant’s origin) would not expose a person to the LD50 
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immediately.  This is because the exposure times calculated in this study reflect a 
summed exposure amount, not a time at which one breath of air would be fatal. 
For the initial simulations and calculations, the wrong value for the LD50 of 
anthrax was calculated to be 0.1 mg which put the lethal exposure times between 10 
minutes and 6 hours.  With these times, the assumption that air inside each zone is evenly 
mixed is a valid enough assumption.  However, with the corrected LD50 and times on the 
order of seconds, this assumption most likely introduces some significant error.  For 
instance contaminant through an office door to the cubicle area would not immediately 
expose everyone in the cubicle area to a lethal dose, but would take time to spread 
through the room.  The contaminant entering from the AHS would be close to evenly 
mixed throughout the area, however, so it is difficult to say exactly how much time 
people have in that room. 
Also, the LD50 for other bioterrorist agents may be much larger than anthrax, 
which would lengthen the exposure times.  More agents should be considered for future 
studies, but for the purpose of studying the factors in a contaminant’s flow through a 
building, studying only anthrax was sufficient. 
Many effects that were not considered in this study could still be studied with 
CONTAM.  These include the effects of outside windows, shutting off an AHS after 
release of an agent, filters and filter efficiencies, multiple AHS buildings, etc.  To be fully 
prepared for the type of bioterrorist attack examined in this study, a model of a specific 
building should be made, and multiple scenarios should be run for that particular building 
to determine what procedures will minimize the occupants exposures. 
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Appendix A. CONTAM Symbols 
 
  Zone Icon 
 
  Airflow Path 
 
  Contaminant Source 
 
 Ducts 
 
  Air Vent 
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Appendix B. Building Details and Specifications 
 
Closed Door 
 Type: One-way flow using powerlaw 
 Formula: Leakage area data (per item) 
 Leakage area per item: 102 cm2 
Reference Pressure drop: 37.5 Pa 
Discharge coefficient: 1 
Flow exponent: 0.5 
 
Open Door 
 Type: Two-way flow 
 Formula: One-opening 
 Height: 2.1 m 
 Width: 0.9 m 
 Minimum delta T for 2-way flow: 0.01 C 
 Discharge coefficient: 0.78 
 Exponent: 0.5 
 
Exterior Wall (one path connecting each wall section on East and West side) 
 Type: One-way flow using powerlaw 
 Leakage area data (per unit area) 
 Leakage area per unit area: 4.1 cm2 / m2 
Reference Pressure drop: 4 Pa 
Discharge coefficient: 1 
Flow exponent: 0.65 
 
Exterior Wall (one path connecting each wall section on North and South side) 
 Type: One-way flow using powerlaw 
 Formula: Leakage area data (per unit area) 
 Leakage area per unit area: 1.14 cm2 / m2  
Reference Pressure drop: 4 Pa 
Discharge coefficient: 1 
Flow exponent: 0.65 
 
Window (one path on each wall section on North and South side) 
 Type: One-way flow using powerlaw 
 Formula: Leakage area data (per unit length) 
 Leakage area per unit length: 0.65 cm2 / m 
Reference Pressure drop: 4 pa 
Discharge coefficient: 1 
Flow exponent: 0.65 
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Zones Floor Areas 
 Offices/Maintenance/Bathroom: 400 ft2 
 Lobby/Executive office: 800 ft2 
 Cubicles: 2400 ft2 
 
Main AHS Supply Fan 
 Type: Fan element 
 Formula: Cubic polynomial fit 
 Cut-off ratio: 0.1 
 Equivalent orifice area: 0.75 ft2 
 Shape: circle 
 Diameter: 15 in 
 Leakage rate: 0.0075 L/s/m2 
  At dP static of 1 Pa 
Leakage class: 7.5 Sl 
 
Fan Curve Data 
Flow rate (scfm) Pressure Rise (Pa) Revised dP 
0 10 10 
1000 9.5 9.5 
3000 6.9 6.9 
4000 4.0 4.0 
 
Main AHS Return Fan 
 Type: Fan element 
 Formula: Cubic polynomial fit 
 Cut-off ratio: 0.1 
 Equivalent orifice area: 0.75 ft2 
 Shape: circle 
 Diameter: 12 in 
 Leakage rate: 0.0075 L/s/m2 
  At dP static of 1 Pa 
Leakage class: 7.5 Sl 
 
Fan Curve Data 
Flow rate (scfm) Pressure Rise (Pa) Revised dP 
0 9 9.0 
900 8.4 8.4 
2500 7.0 7.0 
3600 4.0 4.0 
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Main AHS Return Exhaust Fan (Vents return air to surroundings) 
 Type: Fan element 
 Formula: Cubic polynomial fit 
 Cut-off ratio: 0.1 
 Equivalent orifice area: 0.75 ft2 
 Shape: circle 
 Diameter: 12 in 
 Leakage rate: 0.0075 L/s/m2 
  At dP static of 1 Pa 
Leakage class: 7.5 Sl 
 
Fan Curve Data 
Flow rate (scfm) Pressure Rise (Pa) Revised dP 
0 10 10 
90 9.5 9.5 
180 8.0 8.0 
270 4.5 4.5 
 
Bathroom Exhaust Fan 
 Type: Fan element 
 Formula: Cubic polynomial fit 
 Cut-off ratio: 0.1 
 Equivalent orifice area: 0.75 ft2 
 Shape: circle 
 Diameter: 8 in 
 Leakage rate: 0.0001 L/s/m2 
  At dP static of 1 Pa 
Leakage class: 0.1 Sl 
 
Fan Curve Data 
Flow rate (scfm) Pressure Rise (Pa) Revised dP 
0 5.0 5.0 
40 4.6 4.6 
70 3.5 3.5 
85 2.5 2.5 
 
Ductwork 
 Type: Darcy-Colebrook resistance 
 Roughness: 0.15 mm 
 Shape: circle 
 Diameter: 15, 12, 10 in. 
 Leakage rate: 0.0075 L/s/m2 
  At dP static of 1 Pa 
 Leakage class: 7.5 Sl 
 Length: depends on segment 
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Contaminant Data 
 Molecular Weight: 18 kg/kmol 
 Diffusion Coefficient: 2E-5 m2/s 
 Mean Diameter: 3 μm 
Effective Density: 70.74 g/cm3 
Specific Heat: 0 
Decay Rate: 0 
Default Concentration: 0 
Trace Contaminant: Trace 
Use in Simulation: Use 
 
Contaminant Source 
 Model: Burst Source Model 
 Formula: S(t) = Mass 
 Mass Added to Zone: 0.4 kg 
Release Time: 10:00:00 
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Appendix C – Results Graphs 
 
1. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 1st floor cubicles Doors Closed 
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2. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 1st floor cubicles Doors Open 
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3. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 1st floor office Doors Closed 
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4. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 1st floor office Doors Open 
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5. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 2nd floor cubicles Doors Closed 
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6. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 2nd floor cubicles Doors Open 
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7. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 2nd floor office Doors Closed 
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8. Origin: 1st floor office  Exposure: 2nd floor office Doors Open 
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9. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 1F cubicles  Doors Closed 
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10. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 1F cubicles  Doors Open 
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11. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 1F office   Doors Closed 
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12. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 1F office  Doors Open 
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13. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 2F cubicles  Doors Closed 
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14. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 2F cubicles  Doors Open 
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15. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 2F office  Doors Closed 
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16. Origin: 1st Floor Maintenance  Exposure: 2F office  Doors Open 
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